学术报告 

Equilibrium Altruism 

in Prisoner's Dilemma

报告人：秦承忠 教授

(University of California at Santa Barbara and Shandong University) 

Abstract. Individuals differ in the extent to which they help each other at work. What motivates this helping?

 People have feelings for those they work with. Do these feelings affect performance on the job and what gives

 rise to these feelings? A large number of empirical and experimental studies were conducted in the literature 

relating productivity in groups to the feelings reported by the members of the groups. Empirical and experimental

 evidence indicates that socialization encourages altruistic behavior which in turn increases productivity in workplace

 settings such as team production. Rotemberg (1994) showed that endogenous altruism can arise in simultaneous 

move games exhibiting strategic complementarity. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium altruism 

in asymmetric as well symmetric prisoner's dilemma. Our result implies that endogenous altruism is robust with

 respect to the asymmetries in prisoner's dilemma, which is not recognized in previous literature. Our result 

provides a theoretic support for certain indices of cooperation appeared in the literature. Furthermore, our 

result helps to experimentally test the relevance of endogenous altruism within a model for a rich class of

 real world situations.

时间: 2014年8月6日 (周三)  9:00—10:00 

地点：新楼N224 

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